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Designing Efficient Consumer Rights
Enforcement Systems in Europel
HORST EIDENMLLER AND MARTIN ENGEL
With its recent legislation on consumer ADR and ODR, the European
Union (EU) pioneers the creation of a comprehensive out-of-court dispute
resolution system for B2C conflicts. The proposed system raises questions as
to how consumer rights can and should be efficiently enforced. We propose
design principles for efficient consumer rights enforcement systems in
Europe and sketch an appropriate judicial model procedure. Against this
background, we critique the new EU system: mandatory consumer rights will
not be fully enforced; traders will have inefficient behavioral incentives;
fundamental due process values will be compromised; an unnecessary,
heavily regulated and costly private enforcement industry needs to be
created; access to the courts for consumers will be seriously impaired.
Mandatory consumer rights attempt to correct market failure. Such rights
should be enforced in streamlined small stakes proceedings by state courts,
not by private service providers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer satisfaction has now been at the core of EU legal
policymaking for more than a decade. With ever more information duties for
traders, withdrawal rights for consumers, the policing of standard contract
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terms in B2C contracts, and mandatory substantive consumer protection rules
regarding sales and service contracts, the European Commission
(Commission) tries to support consumer confidence and boost the single
market. According to this program, barriers to Union-wide trade are to be
eliminated step-by-step until contracting with parties from other Member
States becomes as easy as contracting in domestic commerce. 2
Whereas the EU has, for a long time, focused on strengthening
substantive consumer rights, it appears that only quite recently did it come to
the Commission's attention that, according to Holmes' famous "acid test,"3
for consumer rights to be effective, there must be effective sanctions if such
rights are not respected. And since most consumers are not jurists, the
enforcement mechanism must be easily manageable for the layperson if the
consumers themselves-as opposed to legal professionals-are supposed to
use it. It is not the fuss that can be expected to meet the requirements of the
forum; rather, the forum has to be fitted to the fuss. 4
Very much in this spirit, the most recent consumer protection legislation
in the EU focuses on designing efficient consumer rights enforcement
mechanisms in Europe.5 With its Directive on Consumer Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) and its Regulation on Consumer Online Dispute
2 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee ofRegions on
Cross-Border Business to Consumer e-Commerce in the EU, at 16 & 47, COM (2009)
557 final (October 22, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
strategy/docs/COM_2009_0557_4_en.pdf However, it is important to note that the law is
not the only barrier to cross-border shopping. Transaction (shipping) costs, in particular,
are not taken into account by Eurobarometer but most likely create a notable obstacle to
cross-border trade. Their relative weight is significant, especially in cases with a low
transaction value.
3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 991, 995 (1997).
4 Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994). See also
CHRISTIAN DUVE ET AL., MEDIATION IN DER WIRTSCHAFr 351-53 (2d ed. 2011).
5 See EU Justice Scoreboard: A Tool to Promote Effective Justice and Growth, COM
(2013) 160 final (March 27, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ effective-
justice/files/justice scoreboard_ communication_en.pdf; Eric Dubois, Christel Schurrer &
Marco Velicogna, The Functioning ofJudicial Systems and the Situation of the Economy in
the European Union Member States, at 638 (Jan. 15, 2013), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepejstudyjustice scoreboard en.pdf;
Burkhard Hess, Study No. JAI/A3/2002/02 On Making More Efficient the Enforcement of
Judicial Decisions Within the European Union (Feb. 18, 2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/enforcementjudicial-decisions_180204_en
.pdf.
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Resolution (ODR),6 the EU aims to provide a feasible and easily accessible
framework within which consumers can pursue their rights quickly and
effectively.7 Through a network of extra-judicial conciliation bodies and an
EU online conflict allocation scheme, consumer disputes shall be resolved
speedily and in a cost-efficient manner. However, the newly envisaged EU
landscape for the resolution of small-stakes B2C disputes has the effect of
sidelining state courts. Specifically, conflicts are shifted to private or semi-
private service providers who supposedly follow the consumers' interests by
putting efficiency above judicial scrutiny and the observance of due process
standards.
This paper argues that this is a detrimental development. The "settlement
euphoria" that inspires the European push towards a non-judicial dispute
resolution landscape is misguided on both justice and efficiency grounds. It
is simply contradictory to set up a sophisticated system of mandatory
consumer protection rights and to then leave the "enforcement" of these
rights to non-legal private providers, which are not trained or incentivized for
this task and which operate outside the procedural safeguards of the court
system. To put it differently: mandatory consumer protection rights attempt
to correct market failure. Hence, enforcing these rights should not be
returned to the market. This move is also inefficient because "false
settlement" compromises proper behavioral incentives for businesses.
Further, a new and heavily regulated private enforcement architecture
alongside the state courts would undoubtedly significantly increase the total
transaction costs of the dispute system. Finally, even if ADR decisions are
non-binding on the consumer, access to the courts will be at least de facto
considerably impaired. Instead, consumer rights should be enforced in
streamlined court proceedings specifically designed to meet the requirements
6 Council Directive 2013/11, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes
and Amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. (L
165) 63 (EU) [hereinafter Directive on Consumer ADR]; Commission Regulation
524/2013, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending Regulation
(EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 1 (EU) [hereinafter
Regulation on Consumer ODR].
7 See Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 1; Regulation on Consumer
ODR, supra note 6, at 2.
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of B2C disputes arising from small-stakes8 sales or service contracts in
particular. 9
This article starts with describing current developments in the field of
consumer behavior, consumer law, and the institutional handling of
consumer conflicts (section II). On this basis, the paper discusses
fundamental principles of dispute systems design for efficiently enforcing
consumer rights (section III) and attempts to develop a coherent model for an
efficient consumer rights dispute system regarding small-stakes B2C
transactions (section IV). This in turn leads to a critique of the recent EU
legislation on consumer ADR and ODR (section V). The final section
concludes and summarizes the main results of the paper (section VI).
II. THE CASE FOR CONSUMER RIGHTS DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN
Dispute systems design has a long tradition, especially in the United
States of America. It deals with adapting the design of a certain conflict
resolution procedure to the needs of its users.10 It tries to do this by
establishing rules, principles, or institutions that, taken together, allow a
systematic management of a specific type of conflict. By shifting its
regulatory focus from the substantive rights of consumers to the procedural
framework for handling B2C conflicts, the EU enters the domain of
consumer rights dispute systems design.
8 We will assume that small-stakes disputes are cases in which the amount in dispute
is lower than E1,000.
9 This is also one of the core recommendations drawn from the so-called Oxford
Study. See Christopher Hodges & Stefan Vogenauer, European Civil Justice Systems:
Findings of a Major Comparative Study on Litigation Funding and Costs, FOUND. FOR L.,
JUST. & Soc'Y 9 (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.fljs. org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/public
ations/Hodges.pdf.
10 See WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT passim (2d ed. 1993). See also DUVE ET AL., supra note 4,
at 325; Lisa B. Bingham, The Next Step: Research on How Dispute System Design Affects
Function, 18 NEGOT. J. 375 (2002); Horst Eidenmtiller & Andreas Hacke,
Institutionalisierung der Mediation im betrieblichen Konfliktmanagement,
PERSONALFHRUNG 20 (2003); Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching
Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-
Centered Approach, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2006); Andrea Kupfer Schneider,
Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving: Learning to Choose Among ADR Processes, 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113 (2000).
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A. Recent Developments in Consumer Behavior and Consumer
Law
The current European legislation for enforcing consumer rights and
resolving B2C disputes follows a somewhat long-term and steady increase in
cross-border e-commercell and, consequently, in cross-border consumer
disputes. With the rise of the Internet, many consumers have learned to shop
online in a sophisticated manner and to exploit differences in price.12 They
have also gained access to products and services that were previously
unavailable to them. Today, for numerous consumers, national borders play
only a secondary role in the selection of a contract partner. With growth rates
clearly in the double-digit area per year, e-commerce, since the turn of the
millennium, is among the fastest growing sectors of the European economy,
and there are no signs that this trend might reverse in the foreseeable
future--quite the contrary.13
Coinciding with this development, the EU has taken significant steps to
boost consumer confidence even further by setting up a comprehensive and
mandatory system of consumer rights in B2C transactions. These include far-
reaching information duties for businesses, the policing of standard contract
terms, rules on product and service quality, remedies for breach of contract,
and withdrawal rights. Many of these rights are ineffective, inefficient, and
redistribute between consumer segments.14 This has not stopped the EU from
pushing full force in the direction of ever more consumer protection-
literally at all costs. The current acquis communautaire, the Common Frame
1 ISince the turn of the millennium, cross-border online shopping within the EU has
notably increased. One in ten EU consumers (10%) purchased online from a
seller/provider in another EU country in 2011/2012 compared with 6% in 2006.
Consumers' Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Trade and Consumer Protection, at 6,
FLASH EUROBAROMETER (2012) final 332, (June 2012) [hereinafter FLASH
EUROBAROMETER 332].
12 56% of EU citizens with Internet access have in the 12 months before the survey
purchased goods or services online. FLASH EUROBAROMETER 332, supra note 11, at 11.
13 Of all cross-border purchases, the ratio of online business was 18% in 2002, rising
to 27% in 2006, and reaching 46% in 2011; FLASH EUROBAROMETER 332, supra note 11,
at 14. See Public Opinion in Europe: Views on Business-to-Consumer Cross-Border
Trade, at 7, FLASH EUROBAROMETER (2002) final 128 (Nov. 14, 2002).
14 See Horst Eidenmiller et al., Towards a Revision of the Consumer Acquis, 48
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1077 (2011); Horst Eidenmilller, Why Withdrawal Rights?, 7
EuR. REv. CONT. L. 1, 5 (2011).
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of Reference (CFR),15 and the Draft Common European Sales Law (DCESL)
proposed in 2011,16 reflect the EU's legal policy in this respect over the past
two decades. On the level of private international law, Article 6(2) of the
Rome I Regulation has also been designed to ease cross-border trade as it
assures the consumer that he will usually be guaranteed, at a minimum, the
consumer protection level of his home state. Hence, the consumer can
conduct transactions in any Member State without having to be concerned
with the respective substantive law.
B. The Current State ofJudicial Consumer Rights Enforcement
However, the concept of boosting cross-border trade and the single
European market by mandatory rights of consumers and by (minimum)
harmonization of the European Member States' laws in this respect, comes
with an important caveat: as second year law students learn all over the
world, the value of a right depends heavily on the mode of its enforcement
and, in particular, the costs associated with this enforcement. This turns the
attention to the question concerning the extent to which consumer rights in
small-stakes cases are nowadays effectively enforced in the EU.
Rights enforcement is first and foremost the task of the public courts.
Most European Member States allow small-stakes claims to be brought to
local courts whose jurisdiction depends on a claim value lower than a certain
amount, e.g., 65,000 in Germany.' 7 Furthermore, many Member States do
15 For the latest developments as to the Common Frame of Reference see Health and
Consumers, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/health-consumer/index-en.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2014). For the academic Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) see
CHIUSTIAN VON BAR ET AL., STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & RESEARCH
GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS, AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/
dcfr outline edition en.pdf. See also Horst Eidenmfiller et al., The Common Frame of
Reference for European Private Law - Policy Choices and Codification Problems, 28
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659 (2008).
16 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:en:PDF.
See also Horst Eidenmailler et al., The Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European
Sales Law: Deficits of the Most Recent Textual Layer of European Contract Law, 16
EDINBURGH L. REV. 301 (2012); Eidenmiiller et al., supra note 14, at 1077.
17 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Courts Constitution Act], May 9, 1975,
RGBL. I at 1938, as amended, § 23(1) (Ger.). In England and Wales, small claims courts
handle cases up to a value of E10,000 (= C 11,700), whereas Danish small claims courts'
jurisdiction is restricted to a maximum amount in dispute of DKK 50,000 (- 66,700).
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not require parties to be represented by an attorney before such courts.18 In
2006 and 2007, the EU itself established a European order for payment
procedure and a small claims procedure for claims with a value of up to
C2,000, which apply to all Member States except Denmark. 19 The goal is to
make 'access to justice' a reality even for low-value claims. At the same time,
reforms that have made the right to file a claim dependent on a previous
unsuccessful settlement attempt or mediation have been repealed in many
Member States-sometimes because such . reforms were deemed
unconstitutional for limiting parties' access to the courts. 20
Even though Member States have made considerable advances to ease
access to their respective small claims courts, the caseload of these courts is
steadily decreasing. In Germany, for example, the caseload of the local small
claims courts (Amtsgerichte) has declined continuously by more than 2% per
Lower maximum thresholds can be found in Northern Ireland and Scotland (3,000 z
C3,500), Ireland (C2,000), and Spain (E900). In the United States, maximum amounts in
dispute also vary: for example, California small claims courts handle cases up to $5,000
amount in dispute, while Illinois applies a maximum amount of $10,000.
18 For example, Germany (ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, RGBL. I 3533, AS AMENDED, § 78), France (CODE DE
PROCtDURE CIVIL [C.P.C.] art. 827), and the United Kingdom (customary right to self-
representation) do not require parties to be represented by an attorney. In some small
claims courts in the U.S., such as in California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530), it is
even forbidden to be represented by a lawyer in a small claims procedure.
19 The European order for payment procedure was established by Regulation (EC)
No 1896/2006. Xandra Kramer provided a first evaluation. Xandra E. Kramer, Enhancing
Enforcement in the European Union: The European Order for Payment Procedure and
Its Implementation in the Member States, Particularly in Germany, the Netherlands, and
England, in ENFORCEMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY-TRADITION AND REFORM 17 passim
(Cornelis H. van Rhee & Alan Ucelac eds., 2010). The European small claims procedure
was established by Council Regulation 861/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) (EC). See JULES
STUYCK ET AL., AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CONSUMER
REDRESS OTHER THAN REDRESS THROUGH ORDINARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS (2007),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports-studies/comparative_
report en.pdf; Georg Haibach, The Commission Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a
European Small Claims Procedure: An Analysis, 13 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 593 (2005).
20 In Italy, the Corte Costituzionale (judgment dated October 24, 2012, file no.
272/2012) struck down the statutory mediation requirement in late 2012; however, its re-
introduction was enacted in June 2013. Corte Cost., 24 ottobre 2012, n. 272 (It.) For a
critical analysis, see Giuseppe De Palo & Lauren R. Keller, The Italian Mediation
Explosion: Lessons in Realpolitik, 28 NEGOT. J. 181 (2012). In Germany, most states
(Lander) have cut back the statutory requirement for smallest-stakes claims (amount in
dispute lower than 6750) to be conciliated or mediated before they can be brought to
court. EINFOHRUNGSGESETZ ZPO [EGZPO] [INTRODUCTORY LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE],
Aug. 31, 2013, RGBL. Iat 3533, § 15a.
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year over the last ten years-despite significant GDP growth rates. 21 The
situation in other Member States is not different.22 An explanation for this
phenomenon could be that there are fewer and fewer small-stakes contracts
or at least fewer and fewer conflicts arising out of these contracts. Both
conjectures, however, are highly implausible. It seems much more likely that
the transaction costs associated with going to court are prohibitively high for
many consumers, and increasingly so: consumers have to spend a three-digit
amount in court fees for most claims no matter how low the amount in
dispute happens to be.23 Consumers are mostly wary of bringing suit without
a lawyer, which generates expensive legal costs, and a significant amount of
time is also invested in preparation, i.e., opportunity costs are incurred that
will often far exceed the amount in dispute.24 Hence, using existing state
court proceedings to solve these disputes seems to become increasingly
inefficient.
The situation is even more problematic for distance transactions in
general, and cross-border cases in particular. Here, the geographical distance
between at least one party and the competent court, language differences, and
a lack of knowledge as to the applicable substantive law pose major obstacles
that trigger even higher transactions costs for resolving disputes through the
court system. No one, for example, will seriously consider suing a trader
located in another Member State 1,000 miles away for a defective Blu-ray
player bought over the Internet for E100. It cannot be denied that this
negatively impacts on trade and economic growth if no other efficient
consumer rights enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms are
available.
21 DESTATIS, FACHSERIE 10, REIHE 2.1, RECHTSPFLEGE: ZIVILGERICHTE 12 (2012),
available at https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Rechtspflege/Gerichte
Personal/Zivilgerichte2100210117004.pdf? blob-publicationFile.
22 In the United Kingdom, the number of small claims hearings decreased by almost
one third within a decade, according to the Ministry of Justice. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
JUDICIAL AND COURT STATISTICS 17 (2011). A study on statistics of US small claims
courts in 28 states showed an average 14% decrease in caseload between 2008 and 2010.
See National Center for State Courts, Small Claims Fall Sharply in Last Two Years, CT.
STAT. (last visited May 12, 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Civil/2012W5CIVIL.
aspx.
23 Under German law, for example, since 2013 even claims amounting to El or less
result in court fees of more than E100. GERICHTSKOSTENGESETZ [GKG], May 5, 2004, as
amended, §§ 3, 34, app. 1 No. 1210.
24 Only about one third of EU customers agree that it is easy to resolve disputes with
sellers/providers through the courts. See FLASH EUROBAROMETER 332, supra note 11, at
118.
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C. The Emergence ofPrivate Competition for Consumer Rights
Enforcement
The described deficits of state court proceedings trigger the search for
public and private alternatives to the current small claims court system. In the
past couple of years, various new forms of dispute resolution proceedings
have emerged and have taken a significant market share from the public
courts. These proceedings and schemes can be classified in various ways,
such as who operates them, who provides funding, what their resolution
standard is, what type of decision is issued, and what kind of technology is
employed.
1. Operators
As to the operators of new dispute resolution mechanisms, some are
state-run, but most are administered by private providers. There have been
some attempts to establish electronic courthouse systems. In 2002, the state
of Michigan in the United States, for example, decided to set up a civil cyber
court for certain disputes with a claim value over $25,000; however, the
project failed to take off and was eventually abandoned ten years later.25 The
Singapore Supreme Court had more staying power. Today, it hosts five so-
called Technology Courts-courtrooms that are specially equipped with
videoconferencing technology, even though the hearing itself will still take
place in the real courtroom.26 However, the payable fees easily exceed
$1,000, which makes these courts unattractive for handling small stakes
disputes. The first real cyber court still has not been opened, so whatever
states have done to modernize their judiciary looks more like a slight update
than a real systemic alternative.
In many European Member States, consumer organizations play a
significant role in ensuring effective consumer protection. However, the use
of innovative dispute resolution schemes is still rare.27 Several Union-wide
25 See Lucille M. Ponte, The Michigan Cyber Court: A Bold Experiment in the
Development of the First Public Virtual Courthouse, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 51 (2002).
26 See Supreme Court Singapore, TECH. CT., http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/
default.aspx?pglD=57 (last updated June 10, 2013),.
27 A recent example is the German service http://www.online-schlichter.de;
however, its code of procedure is quite taciturn as to the core decision mechanism. The
Belgian Federal Government has set up the "BelMed" platform, which is unfortunately
accessible only after setting up a personal account. See Belmed, ECONOMIE: BELG. FED.
Gov'T, http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer-disputes/Belmed/ (last visited
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clearinghouses and complaint platforms set up a decade ago have not been a
success.28 In Canada and the United States, consumer organizations tend to
be more inclined towards innovative use of technology; here, a number of
online consumer complaints systems are already at work and handle a
remarkable caseload.29
In the meantime, private providers have been less reluctant in leading the
way for alternative procedures. Sometimes, businesses themselves have set
up dispute resolution services for their clients. Those systems were pioneered
by eBay and PayPal, which were the first to create a comprehensive problem
solution tool.30 eBay in particular experimented with a Community Court,
which was run by experienced users.31 Later on, eBay turned to providing a
fully automatic case manager facilitating communication between traders and
consumers, and only highly problematic cases were referred to the company's
May 12, 1024); Stefaan Voet, Belmed: The Belgian Digital Portal for Consumer
A(0)DR, SSRN (Apr. 6, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstractid=2245017; Stefaan Voet, in
CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE 26 (Christopher Hodges et al. eds., 2012).
28 The most prominent of those rarely used platforms were ECC-Net, FIN-NET, and
SOLVIT. See Iris Ben6hr, in CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE 13 (Christopher Hodges et al.
eds., 2012).
29 See, e.g., CONSUMER PROTECTION BC, http://www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/odr
(last visited Mar. 28, 2014). See also What Complaints Do We Handle?, BETTER Bus.
BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/consumer-complaints/file-a-complaint/get-started (last
visited Mar. 28, 2014) (providing an online complaint form. Statistics for the mentioned
BBB tool show more than 844,000 complaints in the US for 2010 alone).
30 eBay customers facing problems with their transaction are encouraged to first
contact the contracting partner and, if this does not solve the problem, open a case at the
eBay Resolution Center at http://resolutioncenter.ebay.com. If the other party does not
show a reaction on the following communication request, the customer can escalate the
case to eBay Customer Support. She might qualify for the so-called eBay Buyer
Protection, an eBay-internal insurance. PayPal runs a similar Resolution Center. See The
PayPal Resolution Center: Your Place to Solve Transaction Disputes, PAYPAL,
https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=xpt/cps/general/PPDisputeResolution-
outside (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
31 In the eBay Community Court, a jury composed of experienced eBay users
decided on cases concerning seller complaints about negative feedback from buyers. See
Colin Rule, Making Peace on eBay: Resolving Disputes in the World's Largest
Marketplace, AC REsOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 8; Colin Rule & Chittu Nagarajan,
Leveraging the Wisdom of Crowds: The eBay Community Court and the Future of Online
Dispute Resolution, AC RESOL. MAG., Winter 2010, at 4. Criticisms as to the fairness of
this dispute resolution scheme are raised by Jaap van den Herik & Daniel Dimov. See
Jaap van den Herik & Daniel Dimov, Can the eBay's Community Review Forum Fairly
Resolve Disputes, 4 PRoC. 23RD BENELUX CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 263
(2011).
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customer service. 32 In many European Member States, business associations,
and chambers of commerce have developed out-of-court dispute resolution
systems for their member companies. The most visible of these are
ombudsmen; for example, for financial investment issues, insurance claims,
health care services (existing in several Member States), furniture sales
(UK), legal services, general consumer affairs (Norway and Denmark), or
Internet issues (Austria).33
Finally, a variety of innovative dispute resolution mechanisms have been
created by independent private providers, such as cybersettle.com, 34
smartsettle.com, juripax.com, justiceonline.com.sg, and recently modria.com.
Making use of Internet technology and software tools, these providers offer
companies the opportunity to outsource their claims management in order to
keep control of litigation risk and enhance consumer satisfaction. Some
businesses even see sound dispute management as an essential element of a
high-service brand,35 which is perfectly reasonable as consumers tend to
accept the occasional occurrence of material defects,36 but care a lot about
how traders handle their complaints. 37
32 The eBay Community Court was redesigned as a Community Review Forum in
early 2011 and not long afterwards closed (in early 2012) due to the bundling of dispute
resolution services in the eBay Resolution Center.
33 For example, the German Insurance Ombudsman scheme has been in place since
2002. It is operated and completely financed by a registered association whose members
(German insurance companies) accept decisions up to a value in dispute of E10,000 to be
unilaterally binding on them. See VERFAHRENSORDNUNG DES
VERSICHERUNGSOMBUDSMANNS [VoMVO], Nov. 21, 2013, § 11 [hereinafter VoMVO].
Currently, the ombudsman office is held by a former president of the German Federal
Supreme Court. Statistics show a remarkable caseload of 17,263 cases filed in 2012 and
an average duration of proceedings of 3 months. See OMBUDSMANN FOR
VERSICHERUNGEN, JAHRESBERICHT 2012 78 (2012), available at
http://www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/Ressourcen/PDF/Jahresbericht-2012.pdf.
Regarding the typical procedure of an ombudsman scheme, see Brian Bloch et al.,
Systems for Dealing with Conflict and Learning from Conflict-Options for Complaint-
Handling: An Illustrative Case, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 239 (2009).
34 Still in 2012, cybersettle.com advertised having settled more than 200,000
disputes at a total value of $1.6 billion; as of today, they have changed their business
model to offering claims management for health care bills.
35 Johanna Stark & Martin Engel, The CESL as a European Brand, in REGULATORY
COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 337, 339 (Horst Eidenmiller
ed., 2013).
36 Ana Beldn del Rio-Lanza et al., Satisfaction with Service Recovery: Perceived
Justice and Emotional Responses, 62 J. Bus. RES. 775 (2009).
37 Mary A. Konovsky, Understanding Procedural Justice and Its Impact on
Business Organizations, 26 J. MGMT. 489 (2000).
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2. Financing
A second distinct characteristic of the new alternative resolution schemes
is their source of funding. Schemes operated by businesses themselves such
as the PayPal Resolution Center are usually financed by the company itself.
Additionally, dispute resolution tools provided by trading platforms such as
eBay Buyer Protection usually do not charge the customer party a procedural
fee. If it is a business association, trade chamber, or other interest group that
operates the conciliation body, the consumer will usually be charged not
more than a nominal fee as a safeguard against abusive claims. For example,
most ombudsman schemes are run free of charge and financed by business
associations and trade chambers in order to encourage consumers to file their
cases using such schemes instead of pursuing claims in a public court. 38
Of course, via the pricing mechanism, the costs for operating the
settlement services are borne by the consumers as a group anyway. More
specifically, all consumers contribute to financing a resolution scheme that
only a subgroup will use. By contrast, with the public court system, it is
predominantly those who use it who must pay for it.39 Hence, even if it is
only the public courts that directly charge its users, it is always necessary to
consider whether dispute resolution services are worth the associated costs,
regardless of who pays for them in the first place. There is no such thing as a
free lunch, and this equally applies to consumer dispute resolution.
3. Resolution Standard
Another analytical heuristic that differentiates consumer dispute
resolution schemes is the resolution standard used. From the perspective of
dispute systems design, it makes a crucial difference whether conflict
resolution aims at enforcing consumer rights, satisfying the parties' interests,
enhancing consumer satisfaction, or pursuing any other conceivable aim as a
resolution standard.
38 See, e.g., VomVO, supra note 33, at § 14; Austrian Internet Ombudsman,
OMBUDSMANN, http://www.ombudsmann.at/schlichtung.php/cat/2/title/Sofunktioniert
%27s#a5 (last visited Mar. 28, 2014); UK Legal Ombudsman, LEGALOMBUDSMANN,
http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014); UK Glazing
Ombudsman, GLAZING OMBUDSMAN, http://www.glazingombudsman.com/home/
consumer (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
39 Costs are spread to the general taxpayer only to the extent that court fees (in small
claims cases) do not cover the full costs of the proceedings. Further exceptions are cases
financed through legal aid. Legal aid grants are not unusual for small claims, but they are
predominantly awarded in family disputes rather than in sales law cases.
272
[Vol.29:2 2014]
AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT
Alternative dispute resolution schemes that aim at a consensual dispute
settlement frequently place an emphasis on interests, rather than on the
positions of the parties or on the rights asserted.40 By contrast, court
proceedings, as well as ombudsman services, typically claim to base their
decisions on consumer rights on the law.4 1 It is important to be as clear as
possible on this issue. If, next to consumer rights enforcement, consumer
satisfaction is stated to be an important goal,42 evaluating the performance of
the provider is possible only if a meaningful way of assessing such
satisfaction is suggested, the relevant data collected, and the results
published.
4. Resolution Type
Another crucial factor distinguishing various dispute resolution
mechanisms is the type of conflict resolution provided. Whereas state courts
mostly encourage settlement but, if the parties do not settle, eventually hand
down a binding decision; alternative dispute resolution schemes sometimes
also yield a binding decision, e.g., arbitration, but, at other times, do not. This
is true, for example, with respect to mediation and collaborative law. In other
cases, such alternative schemes result in a hybrid between consensus and
third-party decision, such as a semi-binding or preliminary judgment.
The most established example of an entity issuing semi-binding
decisions is the ombudsman scheme. Here, the "judgment" is often binding
only on the business involved but not on the consumer. For example, German
insurance companies subject themselves to the decision of their association
ombudsman up to a claim value of C10,000. 43 Hence, there seems to be a
great option value for consumers in initiating a case with the ombudsman:
the procedure is free of charge, and, if they win, the outcome is binding on
the counterpart; if they lose, they can still bring suit in a public court.
However, consumers in general do not fight an adverse ombudsman decision
40 For the difference between positions, interests, and the method of 'principled
negotiation,' see ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 40 passim (2d ed. 1981).
41 For example, the Danish Consumer Ombudsman claims to ensure compliance
with the Danish Marketing Practices Act and the principles of fair marketing practices in
general. See Danish Consumer Ombudsman, CONSUMER OMBUDSMAN,
http://www.consumerombudsman.dk/About-us/introduction (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).42 See PABLO CORTtS, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMERS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2011); FRANK ALLEWELDT ET AL., FINAL REPORT TO DG SANCO-
STUDY ON THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 151,
163 (2009).
43 VoMVO, supra note 33, at §§ 10(3), 11.
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before the public courts because of the high costs associated with court
proceedings.44 Hence, in general, ombudsman decisions also are at least de
facto binding on consumers.
5. Technology
Finally, alternative dispute resolution schemes can be distinguished on
the basis of the technology employed. There exist online tools, offline
procedures, and hybrids of both. Examples of online mechanisms are the
private dispute resolution providers named above in section 1. Offline
systems are used mainly by state or semi-public providers such as the
conciliation committees of local chambers of industry and commerce.
It appears that there is a recently emerging trend to switch to online
dispute resolution procedures. Sure enough, online providers already
surfaced some fifteen years ago, and many of them-such as
cybersettle.com-have not maintained their original business model or have
even completely disappeared from the market, e.g., Click'n'Settle. However,
with companies such as eBay and PayPal providing an innovative, separate
dispute resolution system, and with legislators becoming more ready to
experiment with modern technology, 45 the online dispute resolution industry
seems to be gaining new ground.46 This is not surprising: For small-stakes
distance transactions, online resolution clearly is the most efficient form of
dispute settlement. 47
44 The major cost driver for parties is the attorneys' fees. Certainly, in most Member
States, there is no requirement to hire lawyers in order to file a small claim. However,
parties rarely bring suit without a lawyer. This suggests that those who cannot afford or
do not want to pay a lawyer do not bring suit and their cases remain untried by a public
court. For example, in German small claims courts, the claimant is represented by an
attorney in 87% of all cases (cases concluded in 2011). See DESTATIS, supra note 21, at
30.
45 Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
223 (2008); Hanns Prlitting, Auf dem Weg von der miindlichen Verhandlung zur
Videokonferenz, 63 ANWALTSBLATE 330 (2013); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell's
Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REv. 600 (2009).
For a critical view, see Robert Hardaway et al., E-Discovery's Threat to Civil Litigation:
Reevaluating Rule 26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REv. 521 (2011).
46 The newly emerging services of modria.com, juripax.com, peopleclaim.com, and
justiceonline.com.sg show the recent growth in the industry of dispute resolution
providers.
47 Apart from saving transaction costs, one crucial advantage of online dispute
resolution procedures is that they avoid the emotion-driven inefficiencies sometimes
associated with face to face negotiations. See Joseph B. Walther, Relational Aspects of
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Moreover, businesses nowadays seem to be quite willing to serve as the
sole financier of dispute resolution services and are apparently unafraid of
system abuse by consumers. Businesses can obviously live with third-party
decisions that are only binding on them but not on consumers. This is
because they know that there are enough obstacles the consumer will face
before bringing a suit and because they appreciate the enhanced image that
results from more consumer satisfaction-whatever that is exactly.
D. Recent Legislation on Consumer Dispute Resolution
Against this background of increasing numbers of distance contracts,
systemic deficiencies in the European Member States' small claims
procedures, and the rise of alternative forms of dispute resolution, regulators
all over the world are attempting to modernize consumer dispute resolution
processes.
1. EU Legislation
As already mentioned, the EU has recently passed a Directive on
Consumer ADR and a Regulation on Consumer ODR in order to weave the
newly emerging conflict resolution schemes into a comprehensive system of
alternative dispute resolution for B2C transactions.
The Directive aims to set up a network of locally available ADR entities
to provide fast and low-cost dispute resolution for consumer conflicts arising
out of sales and service contracts.48 Traders need not participate, but, as soon
as they do, they must provide information on competent ADR entities on
their homepage.49 The EU wants every consumer to know about this low-
threshold mechanism.50 At the same time, the Directive is not targeted at
taking cases away from the public small claims courts, but at settling cases
that now remain unresolved.5'
Parallel to the ADR Directive, the Regulation on Consumer ODR
enables the EU to set up a Union-wide online platform for consumers,
Computer-Mediated Communication: Experimental Observations over Time, 6 ORG. SCI.
186 passim (1995); CmsTIAN BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., VERHANDLUNGSMANAGEMENT 5
(2009).
48 Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 70.
49 Id at 75-76.
50 Id. at 67-68.
51 Id at 68. Whether consumers can be forced into a consumer ADR procedure in
standard terms is another issue. On this issue, see Id at 70, 75 and see infra Part V.B.3.
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whereby consumers can easily obtain information on a competent ADR
entity to handle their case and can immediately file an online complaint.52
Both regulations, together, aim to build a comprehensive out-of-court
consumer dispute resolution framework53 to bridge the gap between direct
negotiations between traders and consumers on the one hand, and the public
courts on the other.
2. United States Regulation
While the attempt to establish a cyber court in the state of Michigan was
eventually abandoned in 2012, it is relevant to note that it would have only
provided a framework for medium and large-stakes disputes.54 And yet, it
might have served as a role model for a low-cost procedure for small claims,
too. In any event, it seems unlikely that the technological build-up in US civil
procedure will, in the medium term, exceed the scope of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 43(a), which permits testimony by videoconferencing under
certain circumstances. 55
However, in the wake of the latest financial crisis, there has been
increased public awareness of particular consumer needs such as protection
against fraudulent financial investment advice. In 2010, Sec. 1011 of the
52 This platform is quite similar to the one proposed by Robert C. Bordone, already
fifteen years ago, which in turn referred to the famous (offline) multi-door courthouse
idea, brought up by Frank E. A. Sander. Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute
Resolution: A Systems Approach-Potential, Problems and a Proposal, 3 HARv. NEGOT.
L. REV. 175 passim (1998); Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties ofDispute Processing, 70 F. R.
D. 79, 131 (1976). The similar attempt by UNCITRAL to establish an ODR procedure
has not yet been completed. See Ronald A. Brand, Party Autonomy and Access to Justice
in the UNCITRAL Online Dispute Resolution Project, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L. REV. 11
(2012). See also Working Group Documents-Working Group III: 2010 to Present:
Online Dispute Resolution, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/
workinggroups/30nlineDisputeResolution.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
53 See Regulation on Consumer ODR, supra note 6, at 4; Directive on Consumer
ADR, supra note 6, at 70 ("ensuring that consumers can . . . submit complaints . . . to
entities offering. . . alternative dispute resolution procedures.").
54 See Ponte, supra note 25.
55 This, however, already saves significant costs. For example, in Travis County,
Texas, the so-called I-Jury Online Impaneling makes online answering of jury summons
possible. This saves more than $100,000 per year in jury costs as unnecessary physical
appearances are avoided. It also reduces the number of summons and the number of
scheduled impaneling sessions, saving more than $25,000 per year in rent. See National
Center for State Courts, TECH. CT., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Technology/
Technology-in-the-Courts/ResourceGuide.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
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Dodd-Frank Act laid the foundation for the formation of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in mid-2011, a federal agency
responsible for consumer protection in the field of financial products and
services. Amongst other services, the CFPB enables consumers to submit an
online complaint on any bank-related issue such as money transfers, loans,
mortgages, credit cards, or credit reports.56 The difference between the CFPB
complaint and the EU ODR complaint is, however, that the EU service will
not be restricted to financial issues and will not handle the complaint itself,
but rather simply forward it to a competent ADR entity. A similar service
does not exist in the U.S. so far.
3. Experience from Australia
Apart from the U.S. and the EU, the country with the most significant
experience regarding modem public small claims procedures is Australia.
The Supreme Court of Victoria and the civil courts in Brisbane have
experimented with facilitating court procedures through digital technology.
However, the service currently provided is still restricted to comprehensive
electronic document management support.57 Other countries have mimicked
this approach and have started electronic case filing at least for the written
proceedings.58
For the time being, the efforts of public providers of innovative
consumer dispute resolution have thus far been unsystematic. Legislators
worldwide strive to make their judiciaries capable of competing with private
dispute resolution providers. In order to avoid compromising fundamental
due process values of civil procedure-while maintaining systemic
coherence-there is a considerable need to define crucial principles of
consumer rights dispute systems design for legislators to follow if they create
new schemes of procedural consumer protection.
56 See Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
57 See, e.g., Electronic Trials (eTrials), QUEENSLAND CT., http://www.courts.qld.gov
.au/information-for-lawyers/electronic-trials-etrials (last visited Mar. 28, 2014); E-Filing,
SUP. CT. VICT., http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/ home/courtroom+technology/
efiling (last updated July 30, 2013).
58 See, e.g., Stand der Informationtechnik in der Bayerischen Justiz, BAYERISCHES
STAATSMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FUER VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (June 2013),
http://www.justiz.de/BLK/laenderberichte/bayern.pdf (the AUGEMA program
facilitating the summons procedure in the central Bavarian court for decisions on
summons in Coburg).
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III. PRINCIPLES OF CONSUMER RIGHTS DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN
To outline principles of consumer rights dispute systems design is a
prescriptive rather than a descriptive task. This task does not focus on what
new developments in the field of consumer dispute resolution currently look
like, but on how dispute systems should be designed and which maxims they
should follow. The term 'principles' in this regard means objectives and
quality criteria that shape the design of a dispute resolution system and,
consequently, its functioning.
A. Justice Criteria
The first fundamental set of principles that consumer rights dispute
systems must reflect relates to questions of justice. Here, 'justice' comprises
enforcement of substantive consumer rights, respect for established due
process values, and access to judicial proceedings.
1. Consumer Rights Enforcement
It is not a matter of course that the enforcement of substantive consumer
rights is or should be one of the guiding principles of consumer dispute
resolution procedures. 59 Consumer satisfaction ranks high in current legal
policymaking. 60 But while the meaning of this concept and its measurement
are open to doubt, consumer satisfaction surely cannot be equated with the
enforcement of consumer rights pure and simple.61
59 Christopher Hodges, Collectivism: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Public and
Private Models for Regulating Consumer Protection, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSUMER LAW 205, 207 (Willem van Boom & Marco Loos eds., 2007) (contends that
"the primary focus now is on improving the ability of consumers to realise their rights").
For a different focus, see Linda Mulcahy, The Collective Interest in Private Dispute
Resolution, 33 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 59 passim (2013) (who emphasizes the value of
precedence and of the collective interest in private adjudication).
60 See, e.g., IPSOS INRA, Consumer Satisfaction Survey, passim (May 2007),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consint/servgen/cons-satisf/consumer
servicefinrepen.pdf; Memorandum 11/718 from Eur. Comm'n, Making Markets Work
For Consumers: Questions and Answers on the 2011 Consumer Markets Scoreboard 6
(Oct. 21, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-1 1-718_en.pdf.
61 According to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. Consumer satisfaction does
not necessitate such a right. 2000 O.J. (L 364) 20.
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Especially in today's ADR world, parties' interests are widely held in
higher esteem than their legal positions.62 This is because interests are
perceived to be related to the future, which seems to matter more than
succeeding in court, i.e., successfully enforcing a right with respect to an
issue relating to or having happened in the past. ADR proponents point out
that parties to a conflict want to save time and transaction costs, eliminate
litigation risk, and maintain the relationship with their respective
counterparts.63 The latter aspect often plays an important role when parties
decide to attempt mediation instead of bringing suit. However, the nature of
the respective dispute has a considerable impact on the importance of this
pro-ADR argument. The preservation of relationships is hardly relevant for
consumers and thus, does not push in the direction of alternative dispute
resolution in B2C conflicts. As long as they transact on a sufficiently
competitive product or services market, consumers can immediately turn to
other traders and will have no interest at all in maintaining a sound
relationship with their counterparts.
This is especially true for distance contracts. Whereas in contracts among
locals or within a small industry, parties might not want to burn bridges, a
consumer can shop from an almost unlimited number of traders around the
world. Thus, she can easily walk away at no cost; it is first and foremost the
trader who is interested in a harmonious business-consumer relationship.
This is all the more true as the vast majority of consumer disputes arise from
alleged malperformance by the trader.64 In this case, consumer confidence
will have already been lost in most cases, and the customer will rarely ever
contract with the business again. Hence, as long as the further interests of the
consumer-a speedy and low-cost process at little risk-are met, consumer
protection will mean enforcing consumer rights rather than reaching a
consensus between business and consumer or realizing some other diffuse
idea of consumer satisfaction.
62 The importance of the parties' interests for value creation in conflict resolution has
been stressed primarily by Fisher, Ury and Patton. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 40. See
also Chris Provis, Interests vs. Positions: A Critique of the Distinction, 12 NEGOT. J. 305
(1996) (critical on the differentiation between interests and positions).
63 See Pablo Cort6s, The Potential of Online Dispute Resolution as a Consumer
Redress Mechanism, SSRN (July 6, 2007), http://ssm.com/abstract id=998865; see
Fahimeh Abedi & Sakina S. A. Yusoff, Consumer Dispute Resolution: The Way
Forward, 2 J. GLOBAL MGMT. 204 passim (2011).
64 EUROSTAT, CONSUMERS IN EUROPE 54 (2009). In 2011, one out of five consumers
experienced a delay in delivery, and one out of twenty consumers a complete failure of
delivery from a distance contract with a contractor in the consumer's own country. See
FLASH EUROBAROMETER 332, supra note 11, at 92.
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This argument is supported by research on the social costs and benefits
of litigation. Beyond the individual interests of consumers, the social
function of enforcing their rights is that only then will those rights be fully
honored by businesses. In other words, in case of suboptimal consumer rights
enforcement, these rights will be diluted and hence will be the proper
incentive for traders to respect them.65 If a trader anticipates that, should she
breach a contract, some alternative dispute resolution scheme will be in place
leading to a compromise solution that does not fully compensate the
consumer for the harm suffered, breach will occur even if it is inefficient.
Hence, consumer dispute resolution systems should aim at full enforcement
of substantive consumer rights. 66 Further, the enforcement of rights should
be made public to establish precedential value. 67 A financial institution, for
example, that violates fiduciary duties towards consumers in selling products
to them that earn the institution a commission,68 should be held accountable
in all relevant cases. The institution's liability should not be limited to
compensating an individual consumer who eventually dared to pursue her
rights.69 An individual enforcement level of significantly less than 100% can
be tolerated only if it is compensated by complementary enforcement
mechanisms, including, for example, unfair competition suits by competitors
or forceful collective redress by consumer organizations.
Consequently, even though it is certainly true that consumers are
primarily interested in getting good value for money and not in enforcing the
law at all costs, a dispute system for B2C conflicts should, in principle, be
65 HORST EIDENMULLER, VERTRAGS- UND VERFAHRENSRECHT DER
WIRTSCHAFTSMEDIATIoN 7 (2000); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private
Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 333 (1982); Steven
Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use
the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997).
66 A necessary caveat to the statement in the text is that full enforcement of
substantive consumer rights is warranted on efficiency grounds only if those rights are
efficient in the first place-which is certainly not the case with respect to the existing
European consumer rights acquis in its totality. See supra section II.A.
67 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984); Deborah R.
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is
Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 passim (2003).
68 For consistent case law by the Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] on this issue see BGH Feb. 12, 2004, BGHZ 158, 110; BGH Dec. 19, 2006,
BGHZ 170, 226; BGH July 19, 2011, 64 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW]
2011, 3227.
69 On the case of Cr6dit Suisse, see Martin Engel, Failure at the Lower Levels,
SSRN (Sept. 14, 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract-id=1927238.
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rights-based. 70 Consumer rights, if honored, delineate cases in which
consumers do indeed get good value for money. By contrast, alternative
dispute resolution procedures for B2C conflicts that are primarily aimed at
satisfying the interests of the parties will usually produce compromise
solutions that result in a suboptimal enforcement level, benefitting businesses
yet harming consumers. Sure enough, the majority of cases brought to small
claims courts today also settle or otherwise do not proceed to judgment.7'
However, these settlements are usually reached following a clear judicial
instruction regarding the merits and risks of the respective cases, thus in the
darkest possible shadow of the law. 72 Hence, the outcome of small claims
court's proceedings is rights-based regardless of whether a judgment is
delivered or not.
A further consequence of this assessment relates to the qualifications of
persons that are competent to administer rights-based processes. Clearly,
only trained jurists can be entrusted with this job. If the goal of the process is
rights enforcement, only legal professionals are in a position to do justice to
this goal.
2. Due Process Values
Apart from the enforcement of substantive consumer rights, several due
process values have emerged from the laws of civil procedure of many
Member States that are reflected in primary and secondary EU law and thus
belong to the "procedural acquis" of the EU. 73
Among these values are the neutrality of any involved third party or
dispute resolution provider, adequate competence of such party regarding the
respective resolution standard-which might be substantive consumer law-
70 Hence, we strongly disagree with Christopher Hodges, Iris Ben6hr & Naomi
Creutzfeldt-Banda, who wish to "go beyond the legal standards" and base decisions on
codes of business practice, fairness, or equity. However, they also say that their "position
is somewhat confused." See CHRISTOPHER HODGES ET AL., CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE
412 (2012).
71 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 22; DESTATIS, supra note 21, at 18.
72 The term "shadow of the law" was introduced by Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
73 See Torbjrn Andersson, Harmonization and Mutual Recognition, in
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY PRACTICE IN EUROPE 245, 245-46 (Mads T. Andenes, Burkhard
Hess & Paul Oberhammer eds., 2005); Burkhard Hess, Improving the Interfaces Between
Arbitration and European Procedural Law, LES CAHIERS DE L'ARBITRAGE [PARIS J. INT'L
ARB.] 17 (2010) (Fr.).
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and her accountability. Accountability, here, is understood as referring to the
responsibility of the dispute resolution entity for the results achieved and, as
the case may be, the reversibility of decisions. If a decision hinges on the
interpretation of European law, accountability involves referring a case to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). This indirectly ensures decision quality and
uniform application of consumer law throughout the whole of the European
Union.
In addition, accessibility of the relevant procedure is of increasing
importance. Dispute resolution mechanisms must be easy to initiate, simple
to conduct, available at no or low cost for consumers, etc. If such
mechanisms involve large amounts of paperwork, a lengthy procedure drawn
out over several months, and a disproportionately high cost to the consumer
(e.g., 650 for the enforcement of a C100 claim), chances are high that the
consumer will not pursue his claim.
The above-mentioned principles and values might be regarded as rules of
law only applying to the judiciary in its traditional sense. However, since
handling consumer conflicts along consumer rights will be widely perceived
as a public task, it is paramount that legislators obey these due process values
regardless of how the concrete dispute system eventually takes shape.
3. Access to Justice
Apart from the enforcement of consumer rights and due process values, a
third fundamental principle of justice in dispute systems design is
unconditional access to justice. 74 Especially for typically weak parties, it is
essential to have the right to be heard in court75 and not to be deprived of the
possibility to bring suit by the law or by a contractual provision agreed to
without proper reflection.76
74 This principle is also rooted in Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human
Rights. European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, June 1, 2010. See Gralf-Peter
Calliess, Online Dispute Resolution: Consumer Redress in a Global Market Place, 7
GERMAN L. J. 647, 647-48 (2006); Pablo Cortds, Developing Online Dispute Resolution
for Consumers in the EU: A Proposal for the Regulation of Accredited Providers, 19
INT'L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 4-6 (2011).
75 Hence, we understand justice as being provided by the state by conceptual
necessity. By contrast, Justin Malbon believes that justice can also be supplied by out-of-
state courts. Justin Malbon, Consumer Complaints, in CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY IN
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 339, 358 (Justin Malbon & Luke Nottage eds., 2013).
76 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Access to Justice in
Europe: An Overview of Challenges and Opportunities passim (2011). For the respective
discussion in the United States, see Richard M. Alderman, The Future of Consumer Law
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Access to justice is particularly important where businesses are generally
allowed to unilaterally propose terms and conditions to the contract in the
fine print. Since court proceedings entail unwanted publicity and may lead to
disadvantageous precedents from the businesses' perspective, traders might
try to exclude legal recourse in their standard business conditions and restrict
complaints to alternative dispute resolution. Even though a consumer signs a
contract indicating that she has read and accepts the general terms and
conditions, it is commonly recognized that this is no meaningful form of
consent; nobody truly studies these clauses in advance of signing. Hence,
consumers also typically do not wish to waive their right of access to justice
because they happen to have signed a contract purporting a waiver of that
right. However, if they later find themselves in an alternative dispute
resolution procedure, they are prevented from exactly such access, at least for
as long as the procedure lasts or as long as they cannot terminate it.77
B. Efficiency Criteria
Apart from questions of justice, efficiency plays an important role in
modern dispute systems design.78 Efficiency means maximizing social
welfare on a cost/benefit basis.79 On the benefits side, fully enforcing
consumer rights is, as already discussed, not only a justice issue but also
mandated on efficiency grounds. Further, conflict resolution procedures
differ in how well they protect a party's reputation, which secures future
in the United States-Hello Arbitration, Bye-Bye Courts, So-Long Consumer Protection,
SSRN-UNv. OF Hous. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY SERIES (Sept. 19, 2007),
http://ssm.com/abstract-id=10 15517.
77 Hesitant, but generally open to dispute resolution clauses in standard terms, LISA
K. HOFMEISTER, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION BEI VERBRAUCHERVERTRAGEN 326
(2012).
7 8 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTEs 21-26 (1987). See CATHY A.
COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA S. MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:
A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 171-72, 194-96
(1995); Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems
Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 123 passim (2009); Oma Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan
Katsh, Technology and the Future ofDispute Systems Design, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
151 passim (2012).
79 See Efficient, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english/efficient (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (referring to maximum
productivity). See also Amartya Sen, The Concept of Efficiency, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN ECONOMICS 196 (Michael Parkin & Avelino R. Nobay eds.,1973); HORST
EIDENMULLER, EFFIZIENZ ALS RECHTSPRINzIP 41 passim (3d ed. 2005).
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business. This, however, does not imply that processes and results should be
kept confidential. First, as already discussed, protecting one's reputation
usually is important only for traders because, other than businesses which are
regularly rated in review sites, consumers rarely "carry around" a negative
reputation as a contracting party.80 Second, securing future business is not an
end in itself. On efficiency grounds, market participants who generate
business only by engaging in dubious or even fraudulent practices should
rather be forced to leave the market.
On the costs side, the law generally should reduce transaction costs and
thereby facilitate trade.81 Conflict resolution costs comprise the direct system
costs associated with the procedure and its administration and supervision,
regardless of whether these are borne by both parties, one of the parties, or a
third party, such as the general tax payer (e.g., in case of legal aid awarded to
one of the parties). Moreover, there are usually substantial opportunity costs,
most notably the time that parties must invest in the process. Procedural
efficiency is increased where dispute resolution is not only free of
unnecessary cost drivers and redundant complexity, but also fast and
reliable.82 Together with the tenet of a rights-based solution, this provides the
background for a coherent model for a consumer rights dispute system in
B2C transactions.
80 Even where generating negative customer reputation is feasible, market
organizers step back. An interesting example of this phenomenon is the feedback rating
on eBay. Since 2008, sellers can only give positive feedback to buyers, whereas buyers
can still rate a business negatively. An exception to this asymmetric policy is credit-
reporting schemes, which allow banks to determine whether a potential customer has a
low creditworthiness.
81 This recommendation is rooted in the Coase Theorem. See Ronald Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); EIDENMOLLER, supra note 79, at 63;
Calliess, supra note 74, at 658.
82 On the importance of technology in saving procedural costs, see David A. Larson,
"Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?" Technology Can Reduce Dispute Resolution Costs
When Times Are Tough and Improve Outcomes, 11 NEv. L.J. 523 (2011). It is, however,
not a necessity that the procedure be free for consumers; contrary to the opinion of Zheng
Tang, this can even cause perverse incentives for the consumer. Zheng Tang, An Effective
Dispute Resolution System for Electronic Consumer Contracts, 23 COMPUTER L.
SECURITY REP. 42, 48 (2007).
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IV. A MODEL FOR A CONSUMER RIGHTS DISPUTE SYSTEM IN B2C
TRANSACTIONS
Against this background, a sound normative model for a consumer
dispute system would be comprised of a low-entry initiation mode, a simple
but rights-based resolution procedure, the observance of due process
standards, and the quick enforceability of results.
A. Initiation
Initiation of the dispute resolution procedure must be comprehensible to
the "average consumer" with modest means and without the assistance of a
lawyer. Currently, the best way to realize this is an online standard complaint
form that an aggrieved individual can complete on her own by entering her
basic data and the reasons for the complaint. The complaint form must not be
complex; it is to collect only the most fundamental facts and allegations of
the case. It should further involve the capability to upload documents to
support the alleged claim.
The value of this kind of complaint form essentially depends on its actual
accessibility to the consumers. This fundamentally means that the average
consumer should know about the chance to initiate dispute resolution in this
way. This in turn presupposes sufficient information, not only from state
agencies or consumer organizations, but also from the involved trader
himself.
B. Resolution Procedure
The core model procedure of consumer dispute resolution would begin
with an asynchronous online exchange between both parties aimed at
resolving the issue through plain communication. The trader should be given
the possibility to respond to the consumer's argument and to upload relevant
documents on his part within ten business days. Still, the complexity of the
process should be limited. A well-structured online tool that contrasts the
opinions of both parties and accentuates shared views as well as
disagreements can help keep the conflict matter manageable.8 3
83 A good, although not perfect tool is the recently modernized Juripax technology.
See JURIPAX: TECH. FOR EARLY DISP. RESOL., http://juripax.com/EN/software.php (last
visited Mar. 28, 2014).
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It is debatable whether the model procedure should allow for the taking
of evidence. To include such procedural steps means to considerably increase
the complexity of the system at the risk of the consumer no longer finding
her way through the process. Also, evidentiary issues rarely arise in practice,
as most cases can and will be resolved by acknowledgement, waiver, or
another form of settlement. On the other hand, excluding questions of proof
from the model procedure might provoke abusive consumer complaints with
customers opportunistically alleging business malperformance in order to
compensate for their own mistakes. A compromise in this regard would be a
procedure that does not include evidentiary issues but that allows the case to
be referred to a different, more elaborate process if the conflict is escalated to
a level on which issues of proof become decisive.
C. Enforcement and Publication
Eventually, the outcome of the dispute resolution should be binding at
least on the business and also easily enforceable. Even for small claims,
consumers mist be able to mandate a marshal to collect the debt with the full
force of the public enforcement machinery, if necessary. Only then does the
process give both parties a strong incentive to comply with the procedural
outcome.
Apart from that, if the outcome of the dispute resolution scheme is not a
settlement but the decision of a third party, it should be published so that
other traders and consumers can adjust their behavior to the new precedent.
The publication of results is also important because it helps dispute
resolution providers arrive at consistent decisions that do not contradict each
other. Finally, it also serves to vindicate crucial public policies and principles
beyond the private interests of the parties, such as antitrust laws, which are
easily violated in non-public settlements. 84
This brief sketch of a model consumer conflict resolution procedure
raises the question of where this dispute system should ideally be set up, i.e.,
who should administer it. Which entity is best equipped to establish a rights-
based, low-cost dispute resolution procedure that observes due process
standards and can lead to an easily enforceable and public award? The
answer to this question is simple: It is the state. The model described is a
modem court proceeding for small claims in B2C disputes. It is the public
courts who are in a unique position to enforce consumer rights. Failure in the
modernization of civil procedure in many Member States should not lead the
286
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legislature to remove public courts' involvement in small claims procedures
and to allocate original tasks of the judiciary to private service providers.85
V. A CRITIQUE OF THE RECENT EU LEGISLATION ON CONSUMER
ADR AND ODR
Against this background, the recent EU legislation on consumer ADR
and ODR raises major concerns as to the enforcement of mandatory
consumer rights, the compliance with fundamental values of due process, and
the efficiency (welfare) effects associated with it.
A. Visions for Viable Consumer Dispute Resolution
The EU model for a Union-wide consumer dispute resolution system is
composed of local dispute resolution entities established by the Member
States in accordance with the Directive on Consumer ADR and an online
clearinghouse set up by the EU itself following the Regulation on Consumer
ODR. The underlying vision of this model is to build a new civil justice
system not based on courts, but rather, on private or semi-private settlement
and decision bodies operated by chambers of commerce, trade associations,
consumer organizations, or entirely private service providers.86 The EU aims
to achieve full regional and sector coverage of those services throughout all
Member States so that consumers can consistently choose a cheap and
accessible alternative to the formalized small claims procedure in public
courts.8 7 The EU envisions a collaborative relationship between consumers,
85 This problem is not sufficiently reflected in the otherwise prudent proposal by
Pablo Cortis. See Pablo Cort6s, Developing Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in
the EU: A Proposal for the Regulation ofAccredited Providers, 19 INT. J. L. INFO. TECH.
I passim (2011).
86 See Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 64 ("system of redress"); Id. at
68 ("ADR procedures should not be designed to replace court procedures"). See also
Regulation on Consumer ODR, supra note 6, at 3. Currently, about half of the existing
ADR entities notified to the European Commission are based in Germany. However,
German ADR entities are less focused on consumers, and thus, play a less important role
than the highly frequented ADR bodies in other countries, e.g., the Financial Ombudsman
in the United Kingdom handling alone about one-fifth of about 0.5 million cases per year
in the EU; ALLEWELDT ET AL., supra note 42, at 13.
87 Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 66, 71.
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traders, and regulators, which might in the future even impose an obligation
to use the alternative system before bringing suit.8 8
The EU vision is not the one and only alternative. It is also conceivable,
and indeed quite realistic, for there to be massive improvements in the
existing small claims court systems in the Member States. Such
improvements would, inter alia, result in more efficient court proceedings
and the use of modern technology for case filings as well as for the conduct
of hearings. Legislators might also consider the use of new public
enforcement mechanisms, such as collective redress, punitive damages,
consumer advocates, 89 nauseas and similar measures, to make up for
individual enforcement deficits. Indeed, the EU now, at least very cautiously,
recommends that Member States introduce collective redress schemes. 90
Finally, court modernization could be pushed and supported by innovation in
private dispute resolution services. Such services could and should coexist
beneficially with the public courts. 91
B. Adherence to Fundamental Principles ofProcedural Quality
Whereas the latter vision fully respects and adheres to fundamental
principles of procedural quality, the recent EU regulation does so only to a
very limited extent.
1. Justice
Given that consumer justice demands rights-based proceedings,
mandatory consumer rights should be enforced by judges or other legal
88 Christopher Hodges, Consumer ADR in Europe, 11 ZErTSCHRIFr FUR
KONFLIKTMANAGEMENT 195, 196 (2012).
89 See Luke Nottage, The New Australian Consumer Law: What About Consumer
ADR?, 9 QUTLJJ 176, 192 (2009); CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW
ZEALAND 350 (Justin Malbon & Luke Nottage eds., 2013).
90 See Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 66. See also Commission
Recommendation 2013/396, Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights
Granted Under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60 (EC), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf.
91 Typically, private adjudication schemes will follow economic considerations
rather than public court procedures. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). This, however, does not
necessarily weaken the case for the courts; it only emphasizes the function of private
providers to serve as a potential (technological) role model.
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professionals who possess a keen understanding of the law and operate on
the basis of fundamental due process principles. In stark contrast, the EU
regulation requires natural persons in charge of consumer ADR to only have
a general understanding of the law.92 This is an extremely vague standard. It
is also clearly not a qualification that supports the full enforcement of
consumer rights.93 Rather, it aims at raising consumer satisfaction-whatever
that means and however it is measured-under the guise of consumer
protection. 94
It is also questionable how Member States will effectively monitor the
performance and neutrality of dispute resolution providers if they decide or
settle disputes according to criteria that have not been transparently
established beforehand. 95 Any result may be justified or rationalized as
increasing consumer satisfaction. The existing ombudsman entities employ
numerous employees whose qualification to handle complicated legal issues
is doubtful. Whereas the head ombudsman is often a renowned jurist, 96 there
is no transparent mechanism to ensure appropriate staffing.97 Further,
enforcing private providers' decisions in contested cases will certainly not be
92 See Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 72.
93 However, Christopher Hodges argues that the "advantage of ADR mechanisms is
that they are essentially outside national court systems." Hodges, supra note 59, at 205,
226. This is a distinct disadvantage if the mechanism in question is a rights-based dispute
resolution procedure that is administered by non-legal providers. Id.
94 Against the background of the UNCITRAL ODR Project, Ronald Brand argues
that access to courts is not access to justice and that only an easily accessible ODR
scheme could offer "the hope of real justice." Brand, supra note 52 at 11. Similarly, Julia
HOmle sees "greater access to justice" through out-of-court ODR. JULIA HORNLE, CROSS-
BORDER INTERNET DISPUTE RESOLUTION 89 (2009). This understanding of justice seems
questionable as it reloads the concrete and traditional idea of justice with the abstract and
vague standard of consumer satisfaction.
95 Close monitoring of the qualification of neutrality is especially important where
the respective dispute resolution mechanism was not chosen by both parties. See Felix
Steffek et al., Guide for Regulating Dispute Resolution (GRDR): Principles and
Comments, in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE
CROSSROADS 13, 26 (Felix Steffek & Hannes Unberath eds., 2013).
96 For example, the Danish Consumer Ombudsman was previously Head of the
Property Law Division in the Danish Ministry of Justice; the German Insurance
Ombudsman previously served as President of the German Federal Supreme Court.
97 It is quite telling that the "Competency Model" set out by the UK Legal
Ombudsman splendidly rolls out numerous factors of the staffs competencies on 11
closely typed pages-without mentioning legal skills at all. See Competency Model,
LEGAL OMBUDSMAN (Mar. 2010), http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/downloads/
documents/job docs/OLC CompetencyModel.pdf.
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easier and often will be more difficult than enforcing a small claims court
judgment.98 Finally, the new EU system appears to violate core procedural
values such as the right to be heard in court, the possibility to appeal, and the
public accountability of decision makers.99 Whereas the ECJ currently
ensures consistent consumer law application throughout the whole EU,
referring cases to ADR entities creates significant fragmentation as to the
interpretation and application of consumer rights. The consumer dispute
system designed by the EU promises effective consumer protection but will
yield hardly more than effective consumer sedation.
2. Efficiency
In terms of procedural efficiency, the EU scheme indeed facilitates
complaint filing by making use of modem communication technology. It also
aims at offering a fast-track procedure that is simple to initiate and easy to
comprehend, even for the average consumer. Moreover, traders who
participate in the alternative dispute resolution scheme have to provide
information to competent ADR entities so that factual obstacles to the
procedure are reduced.
At the same time, the regulatory burden for setting up the EU mechanism
is huge. Public authorities in all Member States will have to supervise private
ADR providers, their expertise, independence, impartiality, and
effectiveness. The EU itself must not only build an online platform for
conflict allocation; it must also create an online case management tool for a
comprehensive electronic handling of cases. Hence, a new court-like system
will emerge next to the small claims courts in every Member State. This will
result in an inefficient duplication of resources. It would be much more
prudent and efficient to modernize the existing judicial infrastructure in the
Member States and provide a court-run, electronic small claims procedure
based on the model sketched above.
This rival vision of improving the existing court system builds on the
independence and expertise of judges instead of setting up a completely new
infrastructure that would be difficult to monitor. It also facilitates
98 It is, however, not impossible that decisions by private dispute resolution
providers come with higher voluntary compliance. See Hodges, supra note 88, at 197.
99 The example of the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman shows that
accountability of the ADR entities and reversibility of decisions does significantly lower
the desirability of a scheme: In 2010, only about one out of three complaints was
eventually decided by the Ombudsman. See FINANCIAL SERVICES OMBUDSMAN,
FINANCIAL SERVICES OMBUDSMAN ANNUAL REPORT 2010, 17 (2011).
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competition between state and private proceedings and uses this competition
as a discovery process:' 00 if private dispute resolution providers come up
with innovative (technical) solutions, these elements may later be adopted in
the state proceedings. Such competition is, unfortunately, stifled by
regulating consumer ADR and ODR in the way the EU currently does.
3. Access to Justice
A further, but no less pressing, aspect is compliance with the
fundamental right of access to justice. Art. 1 of the Directive on Consumer
ADR emphasizes that the use of alternative dispute resolution be voluntary
for the consumer and should not prevent her from exercising her right of
access to the judicial system. Similarly, Art. 10(1) states that Member States:
[S]hall ensure that an agreement between a consumer and a trader to
submit complaints to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if it was
concluded before the dispute has materialized and if it has the effect of
depriving the consumer of his right to bring an action before the courts for
the settlement of the dispute. 0 '
Prima facie, this suggests that consumers cannot be pulled into an ADR
procedure in the general terms and conditions of a trader. However, on a
closer look, the issue is not that simple. Recital 45 of the ADR Directive
makes it quite clear that the wording in Art. 10(1) only relates to ADR
procedures that permanently take the case out of the state court system such
as arbitration: "In cases where a dispute could not be resolved through a
given ADR procedure whose outcome is not binding, the parties should
subsequently not be prevented from initiating judicial proceedings in relation
to that dispute." 102 In other words, a mediation or conciliation clause in a
trader's general terms and conditions would not fall foul of the Directive on
Consumer ADR.
Sure enough, the Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer
contracts includes provisions against unfair small print in consumer
contracts. Art. 3(3), Annex (1)(q) suggests that a clause may be regarded as
unfair if it excludes or hinders the consumer's right to take legal action.
Nevertheless, arbitration clauses are not necessarily invalid because legal
100 The value of competition as a "discovery process" was first highlighted by
Friedrich von Hayek. FRIEDRICH A. voN HAYEK, FREiBURGER STUDIEN 249 (1969).
101 Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 75.
102 Id. at 68.
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action is broadly understood in Annex (1)(q) to mean any procedure that is
"covered by legal provisions," and arbitration surely will, in most cases, be
covered by such provisions. It is a question of the applicable national
consumer protection law whether such a clause is invalid or not.10 3 Most
Member States' laws guard the consumer against unexpected arbitration
clauses and deem them void.104 Against this background, the new Directive
on Consumer ADR does not provide additional protection.
Temporary action waivers such as waivers associated with a mediation or
other ADR procedures not binding on the consumer are a different matter,
however. In most Member States, these waivers are unobjectionable even if
included in the general terms and conditions of a trader. Moreover, they do
not violate Annex (1)(q) of Directive 93/13/EEC as consumers maintain the
right to bring suit once alternative dispute resolution has failed. 05
However, the said waivers are hardly less problematic: they urge
consumers to try alternative dispute resolution,106 and even though
consumers may initiate adversarial proceedings thereafter, they will not
pursue such proceedings in most cases. As every mediation practitioner will
confirm, it takes a lot of stamina and determination to fight a 50/50
103 Case C-168/05, Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium SL, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10421,
(concerning a mobile phone contract with an arbitration clause); Gerhard Wagner, Keine
Prdklusion des Einwandes der Nichtigkeit einer Schiedsvereinbarung wegen
Missbrduchlichkeit in Verbrauchervertragen, 5 GERMAN ARB. J. 49 (2007) (annotation).
On mandatory binding arbitration in consumer disputes, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 151 passim (2000).
104 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 13, 2005, NEUE
JuRSTIscCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1125, 2005 (Ger.). In Germany, for example, ZPO
[CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 1031(5) provides that consumer arbitration clauses must
be stipulated separately in order to be valid. The English Regulation from 1999
implementing Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) states that binding arbitration
clauses shall be void except if negotiated individually. See Art. 36(2) Codice dei
Consumatori (It.), available at http://www.andec.it/public/80%2004-Codicedel%20
Consumo%20OEn.pdf?idPP=1365&idPulsante=861 (Italy goes one step further by
declaring the respective standard business conditions void even if it was negotiated
individually).
105 Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA, 2010 E.C.R. 11-3989 (concerning
contracts for the provision of telephone services, including a clause making reference to
the court proceedings conditional upon an attempt to settle the dispute out of court). See,
e.g., GERHARD WAGNER, PROZESSVERTRAGE 445, passim (1998); EIDENMOLLER, supra
note 65, at 14 passim.
106 Felix Steffek et al., supra note 95, at 13, 29 (postulating the principle of
"initiation control" which is hardly compatible with the urge towards an out-of-court
procedure).
292
[Vol.29:2 2014]
AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT
settlement proposal achieved as the outcome of a consensual and often
laborious procedure-stamina and determination that the average consumer
typically does not have.' 0 7 And even if the consumer completely loses out in
an ADR procedure, she will likely be prevented from going to court. After
all, if one "expert" already told her that she has no case, why would she go
through all the hassle and costs again, only to be told a second time?
At the same time, this dispute system is highly attractive for businesses.
By pushing cases into ADR schemes, they can minimize the risk of negative
publicity associated with public proceedings that highlight illegal
commercial practices. The most active and stubborn consumers will be paid
off-in secrecy, and possibly only partially. No effective sanctions will be
administered in the great mass of the cases. At the same time, advocating
ADR schemes as effective consumer dispute resolution tools appears to be an
accommodating policy position. It significantly reduces the political pressure
to introduce public collective redress schemes in the European Union that
would effectively address the issue of mass damages in consumer
contracts-apparently the nightmarish litigation risk of businesses.108
This is all the more problematic if ADR entities predominantly deliver
judgments or opinions in favor of traders-as they frequently do. 109 It is no
wonder given that these entities are primarily financed by businesses. Even
with these financial arrangements, ADR entities publicly stress their
independence and neutrality, and there certainly is no strong empirical
support thus far for the assumption that financing schemes might lead them
to systematically discriminate against consumers. However, the bad taste
prevails, especially where businesses ownitoa process of consumer rights
107 See Herbert Roth, Bedeutungsverluste der Zivilgerichtsbarkeit durch
Verbrauchermediation, 68 JURISTENZEITUNG 637, 643 (2013).
108 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (confirming the
validity of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts in the United States). See also Peter
L. Murray, Die Flucht aus der Ziviljustiz, 11 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIVILPROZESS INT'L 295,
300 (2006).
109 See OMBUDSMANN FOR VERSICHERUNGEN, JAHRESBERICHT 2012, 89 (2013)
(reporting that only 36% of consumer complaints against businesses, apart from life
insurance complaints, brought to the German Insurance Ombudsman were completely or
partly successful. In almost two out of three cases, the consumer completely failed and
one out of four complaints was considered improper action and thus dismissed). See also
Lord Phillips of Matravers, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An English Viewpoint, 74
ARB. 406, 408 (2008) (saying of compulsory mediation in the UK: "You can take a horse
to water, but you cannot make it drink. To which those in favour of compulsory
mediation reply, 'yes, but if you take a horse to water it usually does drink."').
110 See Cathy A. Costantino, Second Generation Organizational Conflict
Management Systems Design: A Practitioner's Perspective on Emerging Issues, 14
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enforcement."' Also, public courts are an institution, which is perfectly
designed according to the principles of autonomous and unbiased
decisionmaking. This calls for the judiciary to maintain full sovereignty over
the interpretation and application of consumer protection law. To shift
jurisdictional responsibilities to private or semi-private providers might
improve access to some private form of justice in many Member States; but
at the same time it will worsen access to independent public justice in
countries with an efficient judiciary.112 Public justice, however, serves an
important role even where the amounts in dispute are low because with these
kinds of disputes, the total societal damage is usually much larger. Just think
of an unfair clause in a mobile phone contract that harms millions of
customers, but where each individual customer only suffers a loss in the
order of El - E10." 3 To lure consumers into a settlement here is to seriously
compromise consumer rights. In other words: If the EU aims at effectively
protecting consumers, it should better guard against false settlement.114
C. The Callfor the European Union
If the EU refrained from establishing an alternative small claims civil
system, what could instead be done to foster innovative and efficient dispute
resolution procedures for consumer conflicts? What does the better role
model for the EU itself look like?
In fact, the EU has only a limited capacity to influence the civil
procedure laws of its Member States. The principle of conferral laid down in
Art. 5(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires a specific legal basis for
any action taken by the EU. A harmonization measure regarding civil
procedure laws cannot be based on Art. 114 Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) on the establishment and the functioning of the
internal market because the special competence of Art. 81 TFEU rules out
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 81, 85 (2009) (commenting on ownership of dispute systems to be
designed).
Ill See Adam B. Kinon, Power Before Interests in Dispute System Design, 17 HARv.
NEGOT. L. REv. 273 (2012) (urging for increased awareness of power in dispute systems
design in a slightly different context).
112 Roth, supra note 107, at 641. See generally Hodge, supra note 88, at 197.
113 Mulcahy, supra note 59, at 66.
114 This conclusion hints at the well-known article entitled "Against Settlement" by
Owen Fiss. See Fiss, supra note 67.
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the application of Art. 114 TFEU.s15 Art. 352 TFEU does not allow for the
harmonization of civil procedure laws in the Member States either.16 Hence,
it is first and foremost Art. 81 TFEU, which can serve as a legal basis for
harmonizing Member States' civil procedure rules. With respect to other
ADR instruments, the EU has thus with good reason solely relied on Art. 81
TFEU, for example, in the case of the European Mediation Directive.117
However, this legislative competence of the EU is limited to cross-border
cases. This constraint also holds for the conceivable introduction of a
European class action. Against this background it is quite telling that the
Commission did not even mention a legal basis in the TFEU when it recently
recommended the consideration of common principles for injunctive and
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States." 8
Instead of considering measures not provided for in the TFEU, the EU
would better act as a role model for the use of electronic infrastructure and
similar improvements in small claims courts. A first step in this regard might
be to streamline the procedure at the ECJ and the General Court, the two
courts of the Court of Justice of the European Union. These courts eat up
huge amounts of money from the Member States by using up to 13 judges
per case and employing costly offline procedures that involve the presence of
persons from many Member States as well as work for legions of
interpreters. Furthermore, the EU could technologically update its own e-
justice portal, including its small claims procedure.1 9 By modernizing the
115 The ECJ has repeatedly decided that measures that come within the limits of a
specific legislative competence cannot be based on Art. 114 TFEU. See Case C-155/91,
European Comm'n v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. 1-939; Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec'y of
State for Health ex parte BAT, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11543; Case C-411/06, European Comm'n
v. Parliament & Council, 2009 E.C.R. 1-7585. See also Stefan Leible & Ansgar
Staudinger, Article 65 of the EC Treaty in the EC System of Competencies, I EUR. LEGAL
F. 225, 234 (2001) (referring to the principle of subsidiarity, Art. 5(3) TFEU).
116 Case C-436/03, European Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3733 (clearly
stating that Art. 352 TFEU does not allow for such harmonization. Apart from that, the
unanimity requirement of Art. 352 TFEU often makes the Commission refrain from even
attempting to make use of this legislative competence).
117 See, e.g., Council Directive 2008/52, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3 (EC) (solely relying on
Art. 81 TFEU).
118 Commission Recommendation, supra note 90.
119 Interestingly, the Union's own small claims procedure, established in 2009, is
rather an embarrassing role model for the handling of low-value disputes. See FEDERICO
VICARI ET AL., ECC-NET EUROPEAN SMALL CLAIMS PROCEDURE REPORT 23 (2012)
(establishing that only 12% of the Member States can confirm that more than 5 (!) cases
have been initiated since 2009; the remaining Member States report up to five cases or
that there are no data available).
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procedures already directly governed by EU law, the EU could set a good
example and thereby even free up resources, which the Member States could
use to improve the operation of their own small claims courts. The EU also
could support and supplement the Member States in their attempts to trim
their procedural laws. Such measures can easily be based on Art. 169(2)(b)
TFEU.120 Member States who today refrain from modernizing their small
claims procedures because of lacking resources or legislative lethargy would
then be encouraged to follow the lead by the EU and thereby help consumers
to effectively pursue their rights.
VI. SUMMARY
With the Directive on Consumer ADR and the Regulation on Consumer
ODR, the EU aims to create a new consumer conflict resolution scheme that
satisfies the needs of businesses and consumers more effectively than the
small claims courts in the Member States currently do. However, from the
perspective of dispute systems design, this policy move is highly
problematic. The benefit of easy accessibility of the new system comes with
severe flaws:
(i) The new system is not geared towards the effective enforcement of
consumer rights. However, less than full enforcement compromises the EU's
policy of protecting consumers in B2C transactions by mandatory substantive
provisions. It also leads to inefficient behavioral incentives for traders.
(ii) The new system also compromises due process values. The right to
be heard, the right to appeal a judgment, the right to publicly criticize, the
right to discuss the ADR procedure and its outcome, and the accountability
of the neutral third party-all these are not necessarily guaranteed.
(iii) The new system establishes a comprehensive, quasi-judicial
landscape of ADR providers next to the courts. The private providers must be
heavily regulated to secure minimum service standards. The transaction costs
associated with this are significant. This duplication of resources-public
courts and heavily regulated private ADR providers-is inefficient.
(iv) Finally, the new system will de facto prevent consumers from
fighting an ADR decision or opinion even if it is non-binding on them.
Hence, it is also highly problematic because it reduces access to justice.
The best institution to realize the goals of a rights-based and efficient
consumer dispute resolution system is not a private or semi-private provider
but the state. It is simply contradictory to craft a comprehensive set of
120 Iris Ben6hr, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European
Union, in CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE 7 (Christopher Hodges et al. eds., 2012).
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substantive and mandatory consumer protection rights and then leave the
enforcement of these rights to private or semi-private bodies whose
independence and impartiality is questionable and who are staffed not
necessarily with trained jurists but with "professionals" who may only have
some superficial understanding of the law. Mandatory consumer protection
rights attempt to correct market failure. Enforcement of such rights should be
entrusted to public courts, not returned to the market. The EU would do
much better in modernizing its own courts and proceedings and should work
towards a Union-wide consensus for the modernization of small claims
courts procedures in all Member States.
297
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
298
[Vol.29:2 2014]
